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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge. 
 
Peter Iacovelli and his company, Dispoz-O-Plastics, Inc. 
("Dispoz-O"), appeal from a judgment of conviction entered 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania. Iacovelli and Dispoz-O were convicted of 
conspiracy to fix prices in the plastic cutlery industry in 
violation of 15 U.S.C. S 1. Their claims on appeal include 
the following: (1) that the District Court erred in admitting 
evidence that government witnesses had been convicted of 
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conspiracy to fix prices with Dispoz-O, (2) that the District 
Court erred in determining that the government's vouching 
for its witnesses by referring to extra-record prosecutorial 
policy constituted harmless error, and (3) that the District 
Court failed to declare a mistrial on the grounds that the 
government vouched for its witnesses by saying they had 
no motive to lie about whether they conspired tofix prices.2 
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court regarding 
appellants' first and third claims, the admissibility of the 
co-conspirators' convictions and the prosecutor's comments 
regarding the government's witnesses' motives to lie. 
However, we find that the prosecutor's extra-record 
comment about prosecutorial policy constitutes reversible 
error. We will therefore reverse the judgment of the District 
Court and remand this case for a new trial. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
Dispoz-O is an American manufacturer of disposable 
plastic cutlery, including knives, forks, and spoons. Peter 
Iacovelli is Dispoz-O's president, CEO, and sole 
stockholder. One type of plastic cutlery that Dispoz-O 
manufactures is medium-weight polypropylene cutlery, a 
popular flexible type of cutlery that is less expensive than 
stiffer polystyrene cutlery. Two of Dispoz-O's competitors in 
the medium-weight polypropylene cutlery ("plastic cutlery") 
industry are Amcel Corp. ("Amcel"), headed by Lloyd Gordon,3 
and Polar Plastics Manufacturing, Ltd. ("Polar"), headed by 
Andrew Liebmann and Basem Atallah. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We have considered the remaining contentions raised by Iacovelli and 
Dispoz-O and conclude that the District Court's treatment of them did 
not amount to reversible error. These remaining claims are that the 
government used first-person pronouns in its opening and closing 
statements to describe itself as a protagonist in the investigative 
process 
and to present its beliefs and conclusions to the jury, and that in its 
closing statement the government impermissibly commented on 
Iacovelli's failure to testify and it referred to FBI equipment used to 
investigate telephone numbers that was not introduced at trial. 
 
3. Iacovelli and Dispoz-O were tried jointly with co-defendants Amcel and 
Lloyd. All defendants were convicted of conspiracy to fix prices. Only 
Iacovelli and Dispoz-O appeal. 
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Dispoz-O, Iacovelli, Amcel, and Gordon were charged with 
conspiracy to fix prices in the plastic cutlery industry. The 
charges centered on a meeting held at a restaurant at 
LaGuardia Airport in November 1991. Prior to the meeting, 
in October 1990 and May 1991, Gordon had sent copies of 
Amcel's recent price increases to Dispoz-O and Polar. In 
October 1991, Gordon met privately at a trade show with 
Liebmann and Atallah and later with Iacovelli and Albert 
Postrel, Dispoz-O's sales representative, to convince them to 
follow each other in making price increases. At that time, 
Iacovelli requested a meeting with representatives of Amcel 
and Polar to discuss pricing. He also contacted Michael 
Kennedy, head of the parent corporation of another plastic 
cutlery competitor, Winkler Products, to discuss"get[ting] a 
price increase." Kennedy declined to discuss pricing with 
Iacovelli. 
 
The meeting at LaGuardia Airport was attended by 
Gordon, Iacovelli, Liebmann, and Atallah. According to the 
testimony of Liebmann and Atallah, Iacovelli outlined then- 
existing costs, and the group agreed that prices were too 
low. Atallah suggested that the group set a price minimum 
under which they would not go in order to prevent 
customers from playing the manufacturers against each 
other. Price increases in the industry were usually set as 
percentages because customers had varying deals with the 
manufacturers and often received prices that were 
discounted from standard price ranges. However, the 
LaGuardia group agreed to fix truckload prices at specific 
levels: $4.75 per case for forks, spoons, and knives, $5.00 
for soup spoons, and $5.25 for combination fork/spoon 
("spork") cutlery; they resolved not to offer discounts below 
those levels. 
 
Atallah said that another competitor, Jet Plastica, should 
be asked to join the agreement if it was to be successful. 
Gordon agreed to approach Jet Plastica's principal about 
the plan. Atallah volunteered to increase its pricesfirst and 
then send copies of its letter notifying customers of the 
price increases to Gordon and Iacovelli. During the meeting, 
Iacovelli told Liebmann and Atallah to refrain from taking 
notes and to pay for meeting expenses with cash to avoid 
creating any record of the meeting. 
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After the meeting, Atallah drafted the letter and an 
explanatory memo for his sales force. He instructed his 
secretary that, before she disseminated the letter to 
customers, she should fax copies of the letter to Amcel and 
Dispoz-O without the "Polar" fax banner. A few days later, 
Gordon faxed a signed price letter with identical increases 
to Polar and Dispoz-O; although sent by Gordon, these 
faxes bore the fax banner of an unrelated company, M.B. 
Financial. Later that day, Dispoz-O issued an increase 
letter listing the same prices. Unlike Amcel's and Polar's 
letters, however, Dispoz-O's letter did not announce the 
prices as a "floor" below which no discounts would be 
granted. Moreover, Dispoz-O did not adhere to such a 
"floor" after its letter was sent out; in fact, it did still 
discount or rebate some of its sales, although not as 
extensively as before. 
 
Iacovelli set the price increases without Postrel's 
customary input. He assured Postrel that the increase 
would "stick," as Gordon also assured one of his sales 
managers. The price increases "stuck" from January 1992 
to early March 1992, when Atallah notified Iacovelli and 
Gordon that he was going to lower Polar's prices. Although 
Iacovelli and Gordon tried to dissuade him, Atallah refused 
to continue with the agreement because he claimed to be 
losing too much business to Jet Plastica, which had not 
joined the agreement. 
 
Later, the FBI questioned Iacovelli and Gordon, who lied 
about their contacts with competitors. Iacovelli denied that 
he had ever discussed prices with competitors, either in 
meetings or on the telephone, and he claimed that he had 
never received pricing information from a competitor by fax. 
Subsequently, Gordon contacted Iacovelli and Atallah to 
arrange a cover-up. 
 
The government indicted Dispoz-O, Iacovelli, Amcel, and 
Gordon for conspiracy to fix prices. At trial, the 
government's two main witnesses were Liebmann and 
Atallah. These two had previously pled guilty to conspiracy 
to fix prices in the plastic cutlery industry and to an 
unrelated conspiracy to fix prices in the plastic cups 
industry. The testimony of Liebmann and Atallah was 
crucial to the government's case because the primary issue 
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at trial was whether Liebmann, Atallah, Gordon, and 
Iacovelli had reached an agreement to fix prices. The 
government's documentary evidence revealed only general 
information such as the timing and frequency of telephone 
calls among the parties and the fact that the parties had 
faxed their price letters to each other. Liebmann and 
Atallah's testimony was necessary to establish the subject 
matter of the discussion at LaGuardia, as well as of the 
other communications between the parties, and thereby to 
demonstrate that the competitors were conspiring tofix 
prices. 
 
The theory of the defense was that the LaGuardia 
meeting and the other communications related to merger 
and joint-venture discussions rather than to illegal price- 
fixing. The defense presented evidence of merger and joint- 
venture discussions between industry manufacturers 
during that time, as well as introducing planning 
documents which analyzed Dispoz-O as a potential partner 
for Amcel. The defense also produced evidence that 
communications between manufacturers about their pricing 
was advisable, given customers' attempts to play the 
manufacturers against each other. Because the topic of 
conversation at the LaGuardia meeting was so vital to both 
sides, the credibility of Liebmann and Atallah was key. 
 
At the close of the trial, the prosecutor argued during 
summation: 
 
       Now, first with regard to the sweetheart deal. You 
       heard the testimony of Liebmann and Atallah, you can 
       decide whether or not you think they felt that was a 
       sweetheart deal. They went to jail and they pled guilty 
       to both counts. 
 
        Common sense tells you people don't confess to a 
       crime, they don't turn a completely innocent, legitimate 
       business meeting into a crime, they don't confess to 
       crimes they didn't commit and that's what the 
       defendants are trying to tell you they did. 
 
        Now obviously they got credit for their cooperation; 
       that's the way it works. But that misses the point. Why 
       would Liebmann and Atallah say they fixed prices at 
       LaGuardia? Why would they tell that to the 
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       Government, who would they tell that to the judge who 
       sentenced them? Why would they tell that to their 
       customers, their customers, if it didn't happen? Think 
       about that. 
 
        They told the Government they fixed prices twice and 
       I can guarantee you the Justice Department doesn't 
       give two for one deals; they had to plead guilty to both 
       price fixing conspiracies and their sentence reflected 
       that. 
 
On the basis of these remarks, the defendants moved for 
a mistrial. The court held a hearing and issued an opinion 
denying defendants' motion. The court determined that the 
prosecutor's reference to the guilty pleas of Liebmann and 
Atallah was made in response to defendants' argument that 
the witnesses' guilty pleas provided a motive for them to lie. 
The court gave two curative instructions to the jury, 
explaining how the pleas could and could not be used. 
 
In its post-trial Order and Explanation, the District Court 
concluded that, even if the prosecutor's comments had 
been improper, they constituted harmless error because of 
the overwhelming evidence of defendants' guilt. The court 
further found that the prosecutor's comment that the 
witnesses were sentenced for "two price fixing conspiracies" 
was not extra-record vouching because of testimony at trial 
that the witnesses had pled guilty and were sentenced for 
two crimes. The court also found the prosecutor's reference 
to a purported government policy against offering"two-for- 
one" deals to constitute vouching. However, it deemed the 
"conspiracies" and "two-for-one" comments to be harmless 
error in light of the context of the trial and the 
overwhelming evidence against defendants. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this action 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3231 and 15 U.S.C.S 1. See United 
States v. Gaev, 24 F.3d 473, 474 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Dispoz-O filed a timely appeal. We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
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II. DISCUSSION 
 
A. The Guilty Pleas 
 
The first issue we will consider is whether the District 
Court erred in admitting the co-conspirators' guilty pleas. 
The government contends that Dispoz-O and Iacovelli 
waived their objections to the admissibility of the pleas. 
 
Our standard of review of a trial court's decision to admit 
evidence of a co-conspirator's convictions is for abuse of 
discretion. United States v. Universal Rehabilitation 
Services, No. 97-1412, 1999 WL 62512, at *9 (3d Cir. Feb. 
11, 1999); Gaev, 24 F.3d at 476; Bruno v. W.B. Saunders 
Co., 882 F.2d 760, 766 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
Dispoz-O and Iacovelli moved in limine to exclude 
evidence of the guilty pleas as unduly prejudicial, arguing 
that the crime necessarily involved more than one 
participant and that the defendants and the witnesses had 
been charged with the same conspiracy.4  The government 
countered that the cutlery plea evidence should be 
admitted to explain the witnesses' motivation to testify and 
the circumstances surrounding their appearances in court. 
Defense counsel offered not to attack the witnesses' 
credibility on the claim that Liebmann and Atallah were 
given leniency by being allowed to avoid charges on the 
cutlery conspiracy. Counsel further offered not to argue to 
the jury that the witnesses got a "sweetheart deal because 
the Government let them slide on cutlery." The government 
countered that the jury would nevertheless be left with the 
misleading impression that the witnesses received leniency 
on the cutlery charge. The court asked defense counsel if 
he would be willing to avoid admission of evidence of both 
the cups and cutlery pleas. He answered, "That's not going 
to happen, judge." 
 
Regarding the cutlery pleas, defense counsel conceded, 
"[T]his whole problem is because it's a conspiracy. If it 
wasn't a conspiracy, it wouldn't be a problem. If there was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In their pre-trial brief, defendants specifically noted that they did 
not 
object to the introduction of the witnesses' guilty pleas to conspiracy in 
the plastic cups industry. 
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a substantive offense of price fixing and these guys pled 
guilty to price fixing, I wouldn't care about it, but it's 
because it takes two to tango, and there's them and there's 
us." The judge asked, "Could we carve something out that 
would deal with this somewhat, to say instead of that they 
pled guilty to conspiracy, that they pled guilty to price 
fixing in these two areas?" Defense counsel replied, "That 
would be very helpful. That would deal with a major 
problem." Noting that removal of the word "conspiracy" 
from the price-fixing pleas sounded "reasonable," the judge 
nevertheless stated, "I'm not ruling on that." The judge 
again asked defense counsel if removal of "conspiracy" 
would suffice: "That will be eliminated. All right. The 
present status of that, does that have you satisfied . . .?" 
Counsel replied, "It does, yes." 
 
The plea agreements were then redacted to eliminate the 
term "conspiracy" and read simply that Liebmann and 
Atallah would plead guilty to fixing the price of plastic 
cutlery and cups. The redacted plea agreements were 
admitted into evidence without objection. Although the 
court's subsequent written order stated that the motion in 
limine was granted in part and denied in part, the order 
also stated that the disposition of the motion was"as stated 
on the record of July 3, 1997." 
 
Defense counsel in fact did use the term "conspiracy" on 
several occasions during his cross-examination of 
Liebmann and Atallah. Then, at the outset of his closing 
argument, the prosecutor for the first time used the word 
"conspiracy," stating that Liebmann and Atallah had pled 
guilty "to both price fixing conspiracies." When the 
argument was completed and the jury had left the 
courtroom, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, asserting 
that the court had "ruled out" admission of evidence 
regarding pleading guilty to two conspiracies. The judge 
replied, "I didn't rule it out, it's what you both agreed to." 
Defense counsel acknowledged, "Yes." 
 
A waiver is the "intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right." United States v. Olano, 
507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 
(1993); see United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1099 
(3d Cir. 1995), quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 
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464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Once waived, a 
claim is not preserved for appellate review. See Olano, 507 
U.S. at 733-734; United States v. Yu-Leung, 51 F.3d 1116, 
1120 (2d Cir. 1995), aff 'd sub nom. Ruotolo v. United 
States, 133 F.3d 907 (2d Cir.), cert. denied , 118 S.Ct. 1852, 
140 L.Ed.2d 1101 (1998); see also United States v. Lakich, 
23 F.3d 1203, 1207 (7th Cir. 1994) (relying on Olano); 
United States v. Gomez, 67 F.3d 1515, 1520 (10th Cir. 
1995) (citing Olano and Lakich). Where a claim has not 
been definitively ruled upon, a moving party must object 
during trial to preserve that claim for appellate review. 
Bruno, 882 F.2d at 767-68; accord Walden v. Georgia-Pacific 
Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 517-19 (3d Cir. 1997); cert. denied, 
118 S.Ct. 1516, 140 L.Ed.2d 669 (1998); American Home 
Assurance Co. v. Sunshine Supermarket, Inc., 753 F.2d 321, 
324-25 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 
At trial, when the government presented the redacted 
guilty pleas, Iacovelli and Dispoz-O did not object. Under 
the facts as presented, we conclude that no definitive 
pretrial ruling was made on the admissibility of the pleas 
and that the failure of defense counsel to object to their 
admission resulted in a waiver of the issue. To the extent 
that defense counsel objected to the one-time use of the 
term "conspiracy" by the prosecutor during his summation, 
that one objection does not appear to be directed at the 
admission into evidence of the redacted plea agreements. 
Moreover, the next morning the court gave a curative 
instruction to explain to the jury the purpose for which the 
pleas could be considered: 
 
       [B]y stipulation of the parties it was agreed before the 
       trial that Andrew Liebmann and Basem Atallah had 
       pled guilty to fixing prices of plastic cutlery and not to 
       a conspiracy to fix prices. As I will instruct you later in 
       the charge, you are not to draw an inference of the 
       guilt of any of the defendants in this case from the fact 
       that other people have pled guilty to similar charges. 
 
In this appeal, Iacovelli and Dispoz-O, in their opening 
brief, set out in the Statement of Issues as thefirst one: 
"Whether reversal of appellants' convictions is required 
because the district court erroneously admitted evidence 
that other individuals already had been convicted as a 
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result of the events for which appellants were on trial?" The 
appellants then stated that this issue "was raised before 
trial by motion in limine, (JA 30), and was argued and 
ruled upon at a conference held on July 3, 1997, just 
before the trial began." Iacovelli and Dispoz-O are bound by 
this description of the issue. Consequently, we conclude 
that the issue of the admissibility of the convictions and of 
the pleas leading to them was not preserved for appellate 
review. 
 
B. Vouching 
 
Dispoz-O's next claim is that the prosecutor vouched for 
Liebmann and Atallah during closing argument and that 
the district court erred in not granting a mistrial. We 
"review a district court's decision not to grant a mistrial on 
the grounds that the prosecutor made improper remarks in 
closing argument for abuse of discretion." United States v. 
Molina-Guevara, 96 F.3d 698, 703 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
There are two instances of vouching in the prosecutor's 
closing statement. The one we will review first is the 
prosecutors' comment on a purported plea policy of the 
Department of Justice. We find it to have been improper, 
and, because we find it was not harmless error, it warrants 
reversal. We conclude, however, that the second set of 
remarks, which addressed the witnesses' testimony about 
the LaGuardia meeting, was within the permissible bounds 
of advocacy. 
 
"Vouching constitutes an assurance by the prosecuting 
attorney of the credibility of a Government witness through 
personal knowledge or by other information outside of the 
testimony before the jury." United States v. Walker, 155 
F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 1998). Vouching is distinguishable 
from a personal opinion based on the evidence presented at 
the trial. United States v. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d 996, 999 (3d 
Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds, United States v. 
Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
 
A prosecutor may not try to buttress his case by 
vouching for the credibility of a government witness. 
Molina-Guevara, 96 F.3d at 704. As we noted in Molina- 
Guevara, the Supreme Court discussed the dangers of 
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vouching in United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19, 15 
S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). The Court stated the 
following: 
 843<!>The prosecutor's vouching for the credibility of 
 
       witnesses and expressing his personal opinion 
       concerning the guilt of the accused pose two dangers: 
       such comments can convey the impression that 
       evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the 
       prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant 
       and can thus jeopardize the defendant's right to be 
       tried solely on the basis of the evidence presented to 
       the jury; and the prosecutor's opinion carries with it 
       the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the 
       jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than 
       its own view of the evidence. 
 
Id. 
 
During the closing, the prosecutor commented on a 
purported policy of the Department of Justice. The 
prosecutor stated, "They told the Government they fixed 
prices twice and I can guarantee you the Justice 
Department doesn't give two for one deals; they had to 
plead guilty to both price-fixing conspiracies and their 
sentence reflected that."5 
 
We ruled that comments similar to that of the prosecutor 
here were improper vouching in United States v. DiLoreto, 
888 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1989), a case involving conspiracy to 
distribute narcotics. The government witnesses were drug 
dealers who had entered into plea bargains. The defense 
attorneys strongly attacked the credibility and bias of the 
witnesses by arguing that the witnesses were testifying only 
because of "their own benefits, by their own interests, by 
their own motives" relating to their deals with the 
government. Id. at 998. During closing rebuttal, the 
prosecutor stated in part: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. As discussed above, we conclude that Iacovelli and Dispoz-O waived 
their objections to the admission of evidence of the witnesses' guilty 
pleas. For that reason, the discussion in this section concerns only the 
reference in the government's remarks to the plea bargain policy of the 
Department of Justice. 
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       And you also heard that they have a plea bargain, and 
       you heard what happened when that plea bargain is 
       not fulfilled. If they lie, that bargain is off. That's it, no 
       bargain. We don't take liars. We don't put liars on the 
       stand. We don't do that. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
On appeal, we reversed,6 stating: 
 
       By this language in his closing rebuttal statement, the 
       prosecutor asserted to the jury that the government 
       does not use liars as witnesses in its cases. . . . No 
       explanation was given, however, of how the government 
       ascertains the honesty or veracity of its witnesses. 
       Indeed, we have found nothing in the record upon 
       which the prosecutor could have grounded his 
       statement. There must then have been some other 
       evidence, unknown or unavailable to the jury, which 
       convinced the prosecutor that his witnesses were not 
       liars. Obviously, the defendants were not confronted 
       with this extraneous evidence and afforded cross- 
       examination, nor was the jury given an opportunity to 
       engage in its own evaluation. What the jury was led to 
       do instead was merely to infer that other information 
       existed, which the government used to verify the 
       credibility of its witnesses prior to introducing their 
       testimonies at trial. 
 
Id. at 999. 
 
Here, the prosecutor similarly tried to buttress the 
credibility of cooperating witnesses by providing extra- 
record information. His remark about the purported policy 
of the Department of Justice not to give "two-for-one deals" 
was meant to convince the jury that the prosecutor knew 
that the witnesses were telling the truth -- that the 
department would not give a deal in return for the two 
guilty pleas unless it was convinced that there were two 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In DiLoreto, we used a per se rule to determine whether reversal was 
required. 888 F.2d at 999. We overruled DiLoreto 's per se rule in our en 
banc decision in United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1267 (3d Cir. 
1995). However, we did not overrule the result reached in DiLoreto, 
reversing the convictions. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d at 1255 n.1. 
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price fixing offenses and that Liebmann and Atallah were 
criminally involved in both of them. The jury was led to 
infer that the government had information with which they 
were able to confirm that Liebmann and Atallah were 
truthful in their recitations of their involvement and also 
that of the other "conspirators," i.e., Iacovelli, Dispoz-O, 
Gordon, and Amcel. The inference was, therefore, that the 
department had verified the existence of both conspiracies, 
but there was no explanation of how the department had 
made this verification.7 Without such an explanation, 
Iacovelli and Dispoz-O were deprived of the chance to cross- 
examine. Moreover, the jury may have been persuaded by 
this language to find that the witnesses' statements 
implicating Iacovelli and Dispoz-O were accurate and, thus, 
that Iacovelli and Dispoz-O were guilty. See DiLoreto, 888 
F.2d at 1000. For this reason, the prosecutor's extra-record 
remark constituted vouching. 
 
Even if a prosecutor is found to have vouched for a 
government witness, however, the government may 
defensively invoke the "invited response" doctrine in an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Judge Stapleton considers it unlikely that a juror would infer from the 
government's reference to a policy against two-for-one deals that the 
Justice Department "had verified the existence of both conspiracies." He 
nevertheless concludes that this reference provides impermissible 
support for the veracity of Liebmann and Atallah and that this 
prosecutorial misconduct was not harmless. 
 
In Judge Stapleton's view the defense properly argued to the jury that 
Liebmann and Atallah decided to perjure themselves about (and plead 
guilty to) a non-existent plastic cutlery conspiracy because they expected 
that, as a result of doing so, they would receive less punishment than 
they would receive if they confessed only to the plastic cup conspiracy 
(i.e., a sweetheart deal). The prosecutor's reference to a policy against 
two-for-one deals was tendered in an attempt to counter this argument. 
This reference was intended to suggest that, when Liebmann and Atallah 
confessed to the FBI participation in a second conspiracy, they were 
speaking against their own interests because they knew that, under 
Justice Department policy, a second confession would necessarily lead to 
a second indictment and two sentences based on the two crimes. There 
was no record evidence, however, from which a juror could conclude that 
a policy against two-for-one deals existed, or, accordingly, that it 
played 
a role in the decisions of Liebmann and Atallah to confess to the second 
conspiracy. 
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attempt to prevent reversal. The invited response doctrine 
covers comments made in "reasonable response to improper 
attacks by defense counsel." Walker, 155 F.3d at 186 n.5, 
quoting United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1126 (3d 
Cir. 1990); United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 218 (3d 
Cir. 1992). The doctrine's rationale is that "the unfair 
prejudice flowing from the two arguments may balance 
each other out, thus obviating the need for a new trial." 
Walker, 155 F.3d at 186 n.5 (quoting Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 
1126). A prosecutor may use the doctrine defensively, but 
not offensively, as a "springboard" launching affirmative 
attacks upon defendants. Id.; Pelullo , 964 F.2d at 218. 
 
The government claims that its "guarantee" was in proper 
response to specific comments of defense counsel in 
opening and closing arguments about the "sweetheart deal" 
that the witnesses landed in the plastic cups case by 
inventing the price fixing in cutlery. Defense counsel 
asserted that, in order to get shorter sentences than the 
ones they were already facing for the plastic cups 
conspiracy, Liebmann and Atallah lied by telling the 
government that defendants were involved in a cutlery 
conspiracy. Counsel did not accuse the prosecution of 
participating in the alleged lie. Rather, defense counsel 
asserted that the witnesses confirmed the suspicions which 
the prosecution had about price fixing of cutlery, based on 
the fact that telephone calls had been made and that the 
meeting at LaGuardia had been held. Referring to the 
witnesses' alleged fabrications, counsel stated,"Does that 
mean that these prosecutors are coming in here and selling 
a lie? No, it doesn't." 
 
Unless the defense had made direct attacks on the 
prosecution or on other law enforcement officials, we 
cannot say that the prosecutor's comment about the 
Justice Department's purported plea bargaining policy was 
permissible under the invited response doctrine. We have 
generally found the invited response doctrine to be 
applicable only in instances where the prosecution team 
was attacked for reasons unsupported by the evidence at 
trial. See United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1364- 
66 (3d Cir. 1991) (comments including assertion that 
government suborned perjury); United States v. Pungitore, 
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910 F.2d 1084, 1127 (3d Cir. 1990) (personal attacks on 
integrity of prosecutors and law enforcement officers); see 
also Pelullo, 964 F.2d at 217-18 (comment that government 
suborned perjury); United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d 769, 
778 (3d Cir. 1982) (comment that government avoided 
questioning witness about entrapment allegations); cf. 
Young, 470 U.S. at 9 ("Defense counsel, like his adversary, 
must not be permitted to make unfounded and 
inflammatory attacks on the opposing advocate.").8 
 
Moreover, we have distinguished between an attack on 
the testimony given by a government agent and a situation 
where the prosecution is accused of putting on a case 
which it knew was false. In the former situation, we found 
the invited response doctrine to be inapplicable. See Molina- 
Guevara, 96 F.3d at 705. In Molina-Guevara , defense 
counsel attacked the credibility of a government agent who 
testified. The defense urged the jury to consider that the 
agent -- whose "frustrating" job it was to catch criminals 
who sometimes "g[o]t away" -- was"human" and may have 
"erred," "stretched," or even "lied" when testifying about the 
drug bust at issue. Id. at 701-02. In turn, the prosecutor 
vouched for the agent by saying that it would be"insulting" 
and "ridiculous" for the jury to assume that the United 
States would present a witness who would lie and that the 
agent "did not lie to you." Id. at 704.9 We determined that 
the government's statements were not excused under the 
invited response doctrine because defense counsel's 
comments fell within the bounds of "vigorous advocacy 
entirely appropriate for a case that turned on the jury's 
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses." Id. at 705. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The government cites the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. 
Eltayib, 88 F.3d 157, 173 (2d Cir. 1996) to support its argument that it 
properly responded to defense counsel's attacks that"impugned the 
integrity of [its] case." Unlike the instant case, however, the defense in 
Eltayib directly attacked the prosecution, asserting that it had 
fabricated 
an informant's testimony. Id. 
 
9. The prosecution also argued that another agent, if called as a witness, 
would have corroborated the testifying agent's story. The case was 
reversed because we found that comment to be violative of the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Molina-Guevara, 96 F.3d 
at 702-03. 
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Here, defense counsel did not directly attack the 
 538<!>prosecution. Although defense counsel attacked the 
 
witnesses' credibility based on their possible motivation to 
plead guilty and to testify, defense counsel did not suggest, 
for instance, that the prosecutor was suborning perjury. 
Consequently, the prosecution's comment did not qualify as 
an invited response. 
 
Because we find that the invited response doctrine is not 
applicable, we must next evaluate the vouching to 
determine whether it constituted harmless error. Zehrbach, 
47 F.3d at 1264. This Court en banc has held that 
vouching that is aimed at the witness's credibility and is 
based on extra-record evidence is deemed non- 
constitutional error. Id. at 1265.10 
 
Non-constitutional error is considered harmless when"it 
is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Iacovelli and Dispoz-O cite a recent Supreme Court case, Gray v. 
Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998), to 
support their proposition that the prosecutor's vouching here is 
constitutional error, violating the Sixth Amendment. They claim that 
Gray overruled Zehrbach. However, the language in Gray does not extend 
to prosecutorial vouching. In Gray, the Supreme Court extended its 
ruling in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 
L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). Bruton was found guilty after the confession of a 
non-testifying co-defendant was admitted at a joint trial. Because the 
confession named and incriminated Bruton, the Court found that its 
admission violated Bruton's Sixth Amendment rights despite a limiting 
instruction to the jury that the confession should only be considered as 
evidence against the defendant who had confessed. Gray extended that 
protection to a defendant faced with the admission of such a confession 
by a codefendant when the confession was redacted by substituting a 
blank space or the word "deleted" for the defendant's name. Gray, 118 
S.Ct. at 1153. The decision in Gray focuses on "powerfully incriminating 
extrajudicial statements of a codefendant," id. at 1155 (quoting 
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 207 (1987)), which are "so 
prejudicial that limiting instructions cannot work." Id. Vouching, as a 
category of statements, does not necessarily rise to the same level of 
prejudice as does the type of redacted confession involved in Gray. In 
many instances of vouching, curative instructions do indeed neutralize 
the improper statement. See, e.g., Zehrbach, 47 F.3d at 1267. We 
conclude that our determination that vouching is non-constitutional 
error does not run afoul of Gray. 
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judgment." Id., quoting Government of Virgin Islands v. Toto, 
529 F.2d 278, 284 (3d Cir. 1976). "High probability" is 
found where the court has a "sure conviction that the error 
did not prejudice" the defendant. Zehrbach , 47 F.3d at 
1265, quoting United States v. Jannoti, 729 F.2d 213, 219- 
20 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880, 105 S.Ct. 243, 244, 
83 L.Ed.2d 182 (1984). The test for determining prejudice 
is tripartite. The factors to be examined are the scope of the 
comments and their relationship to the proceeding, the 
extent of any curative instructions, and the strength of the 
evidence against defendants. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d at 1265. 
 
Here, the prosecution depended on testimony from 
Liebmann and Atallah to establish that the discussions 
with defendants at the LaGuardia meeting were about price 
fixing. The prosecution claimed that the parties entered into 
an agreement to fix prices at LaGuardia. The defense 
argued and presented evidence that they were meeting for 
the permissible purpose of discussing a joint venture or 
merger. The credibility of Liebmann and Atallah was a 
crucial issue which both sides addressed during their 
closing arguments. 
 
The "two-for-one" comment was made toward the end of 
the prosecutor's closing argument. Immediately after the 
prosecutor finished, the court excused the jury. Amcel's 
defense counsel then moved for a mistrial, primarily 
objecting to the prosecutor's reference to the witnesses' 
guilty pleas as involving a conspiracy. Iacovelli and 
Dispoz-O joined in Amcel's objections and objected 
specifically to the vouching comment. At this point, the 
judge only commented on the "conspiracy" reference -- 
resolving to address it during the jury charge and advising 
the prosecutors that they had a chance to cure any harm 
during their rebuttal, which was about to begin. Later, at 
the end of the government's rebuttal, the judge dismissed 
the jury until the next day, and defense counsel renewed its 
motion for a mistrial. The judge denied the motion, subject 
to revisiting it after trial if defendants were convicted. The 
next day, at the beginning of its charge to the jury, the 
judge specifically addressed the "conspiracy" issue, but not 
the "two-for-one" comment. 
 
                                18 
  
Although the law assumes that jurors follow the 
instructions they receive, Richardson v. Marsh , 481 U.S. 
200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987), the 
circumstances surrounding the curative instructions are to 
be examined under the Zehrbach test. First, the 
instructions given here were not specifically directed to the 
statements of the prosecutor. Instead, the judge generally 
instructed the jury to evaluate the credibility of witnesses 
who pled guilty because they might be motivated to lie. The 
judge told the jury that an important way of determining 
whether the government had proved defendants guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt was to evaluate the witnesses' 
testimony. The jury was not informed, however, that the 
prosecutor's statement about bargaining policy could not be 
considered as evidence. The instructions, thus, were not 
curative of the prosecutor's comment, see Government of 
Virgin Islands v. Mujahid, 990 F.2d 111, 116 (3d Cir. 1993), 
and we are not convinced that they adequately neutralized 
the harm caused by the prosecutor's reference to the 
government's policy in making "two-for-one" deals. 
 
The final factor to be considered is the closeness of the 
case. During its closing, the prosecution made it clear that 
Liebmann's and Atallah's testimony was central to the 
strength of its case: "[Y]ou have heard from roughly 18 
witnesses and seen hundreds of documents, but this case 
still comes down to that one issue: did the defendants 
secretly meet at LaGuardia, Andrew Liebmann and Basem 
Atallah, and agree to fix prices on cutlery or instead did 
they meet to discuss a three-way joint venture?" 11 Later, 
asserting that an agreement need not be reached in writing 
and could be established "by a wink of an eye," he stated, 
"And that is why the issue is what happened at LaGuardia 
because once the agreement is reached, the crime is 
complete." Then, after describing the LaGuardia meeting 
according to Liebmann's and Atallah's testimony, the 
prosecutor told the jury: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The prosecutor went on to state that the phone records, faxes, and 
other documents "corroborate" the witnesses' testimony. The final 
component of his proof was evidence that establishing that Iacovelli lied 
to the FBI and testified falsely. 
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       That's the agreement. At that point in time the crime 
       was committed, the crime was complete. Those 
       defendants and Polar fixed prices, they are guilty of 
       price fixing. Nothing else has to be shown in order to 
       convict them of price fixing. 
 
        Now, what happened afterwards is additional proof 
       that they fixed prices. And you'll see, there is plenty 
       more proof, but the agreement, the agreement was 
       reached at LaGuardia. 
 
The witnesses' testimony was clearly central to the 
government's case. Without it, the prosecution could not 
establish that there was an agreement to fix prices. The 
defense, recognizing that, endeavored to develop an 
alternative theory of the discussions and sharing of pricing 
information. We find the crucial nature of the witnesses' 
testimony to be an important factor in determining whether 
the prosecutor's remark was prejudicial. See Molina- 
Guevara, 96 F.3d at 705. When we consider the 
significance of Liebmann and Atallah's credibility and 
compare that to the general nature of the court's 
instructions, we are not left with the "sure conviction that 
the error did not prejudice the defendant," Zehrbach, 47 
F.3d at 1265. Consequently, Iacovelli and Dispoz-O's 
convictions cannot stand. 
 
Dispoz-O also challenges as vouching a second portion of 
the government's closing, during which the prosecutor 
stated as follows: 
 
       Common sense tells you people don't confess to a 
       crime, they don't turn a completely innocent, legitimate 
       business meeting into a crime, they don't confess to 
       crimes they didn't commit and that's what the 
       defendants are trying to tell you they did. 
 
        Now obviously they got credit for their cooperation; 
       that's the way it works. But that misses the point. Why 
       would Liebmann and Atallah say they fixed prices at 
       LaGuardia? Why would they tell that to the 
       Government, why would they tell that to the judge who 
       sentenced them? Why would they tell that to their 
       customers, their customers, if it didn't happen? Think 
       about that. 
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Dispoz-O objects to the first part of these remarks on the 
ground that the prosecutor expressly told the jury that 
Liebmann's and Atallah's convictions conclusively 
established the criminality of the LaGuardia meeting. The 
nature of these remarks was an appeal to the jury's 
common sense regarding the witnesses' credibility. Because 
the remarks were a request to the jury to view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the prosecutor's case, they 
were not improper. Walker, 155 F.3d at 189. 
 
Dispoz-O also contends that the prosecutor's reference to 
Liebmann's and Atallah's statements that they fixed prices 
at LaGuardia constituted vouching. However, a review of 
the record reveals that Liebmann and Atallah testified that 
they fixed prices at LaGuardia and that the defense 
challenged the truth of their testimony. Because the 
prosecutor's remark about fixing prices referred to evidence 
presented in the record, it does not constitute vouching. 
United States v. Dolasco, 470 F.2d 1297, 1299 (3d Cir. 
1972). 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the judgment of 
the District Court and remand this case for a new trial for 
Iacovelli and Dispoz-O. 
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